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THE ROLE OF AMMUNITION IN A BALANCED
PROGRAM OF GUN CONTROL: A CRITIQUE OF
THE MOYNIHAN BULLET BILLS
Scott D. Dailard*
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
"Guns don't kill people-bullets do."
1
This tired old line plucked from the repertoire of comedian, Pat Paulsen, has
been reborn as the guiding principle of an innovative gun control strategy proposed by
New York's senior senator, Daniel Patrick Moynihan.2 A series of bills introduced by
Moynihan to the 103d Congress propose to stall America's urban arms race and reduce
levels of violent crime by regulating the manufacture and sale of certain classes of
handgun ammunition.
Moynihan's proposed legislation emerges as an unexpected stepchild of sixty-five
years of federal gun control legislation. Since the birth of national firearms policy in
1934, Congress has neither adopted nor proposed any primary gun control strategy
based on the regulation of ammunition. Instead, the great American gun control debate
has always hinged on the dual axes of the "bad gun" and the "bad user." From one
end of the political spectrum, the gun control lobby decries the proliferation of fire-
arms in society and calls for legislation banning private ownership of an expanding list
of weapons. From the opposite extreme, a powerful gun lobby steadfastly resists any
proposal to restrict the availability of guns, while pinning the blame for gun-related
violence on a justice system too soft on the criminal misuse of firearms.
The middle ground is occupied by a largely ineffectual federal legislation of
compromise featuring mild ownership restrictions,3 milder dealer licensing require-
ments, and a selective weapons ban proscribing a few handgun imports and some
obscure if extravagantly dangerous gangland weapons that are no more a part of the
contemporary crime scene than Scarface Al Capone.4
* Scott Dailard is a lawyer and a journalist living in the San Francisco Bay area. Dailard is a
graduate of the Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley and Harvard College.
He is currently serving as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable Samuel Conti in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California (San Francisco).
1. Christopher Simser, Biting the Bullet, NAT'L REv., March 13, 1987, at 30 (quoting comedian
Pat Paulsen).
2. "If we are serious about reducing crime - if we are concerned about children
killing children - ammunition to these guns ought be banned. After all, guns don't kill
people; bullets do." 137 CONG. REc. S10,070 (daily ed. July 16, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan).
3. Gun Control Act of 1968, § 902, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)-(h) (1988).
4. The National Firearms Act of 1934 banned the civilian ownership of machine guns,
sawed-off shotguns, silencers and other relatively rare firearms that had acquired repu-
tations as gangster weapons in the years preceding its passage. National Firearms Act of
1934, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). Restric-
tions on importation of certain foreign handguns, military surplus and other firearms
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Both friends and foes of gun control legislation agree that the existing laws have
failed. However, each group points to this failure as a confirmation of their antithetical
positions. Proponents of strict controls argue that the failure of the 1968 Act proves
that stricter controls are necessary. Opponents view this same failure as proof that no
controls will work.5
While the legislature has deadlocked, statisticians have quietly measured the
human price our nation pays for the lack of an effective firearms policy. During the
1980s, gunshots killed three times as many people as did AIDS.6 More than 60,000
Americans lost their lives to guns during the past two years alone-more than the
number of casualties sustained by American forces during the Vietnam War.7 Today,
the lifetime risk of death from homicide for U.S. males is one in 164.8 For black
males this risk surges to one in twenty-eight, roughly twice the hazard of combat death
faced by marines serving in Vietnam.' During 1991, guns accounted for more than
8,000 deaths and injuries in Los Angeles County alone-thirteen times the casualties
suffered in Desert Storm.1" While guns kill many, they wound five times more than
they kill, and they terrorize far more than they injure." Firearms inflict as many as
175,000 wounds each year. 2 In 1989, guns were wielded in nearly 600,000 crimes of
violence, including 7,600 rapes and over 508,000 cases of aggravated assault. 3 Ac-
cording to the Justice Department, assailants armed with handguns rape thirty-three
women, rob 575 people and assault another 1,116 every day of the year. 4
A new and alarming feature of these statistics is the abrupt appearance of young
children on the lists of both perpetrators and victims of firearm violence. The record of
gunshot wound admissions at the King/Drew Medical Center in Los Angeles reflect
this disturbing trend. Prior to 1980, the center had not admitted a single child under
the age of ten for gun-related injuries. 5 However, between 1980 and 1987, the Center
admitted thirty-four children for gunshot wounds, many resulting in the loss of hands,
fingers, eyes, organs and brain tissue.' 6 These figures reflect a dramatic surge in juve-
nile violent crime and weapons violations commencing in the early 1980s."7
not "particularly suitable for or readily adaptable to sporting purposes" are contained
in the Gun Control Act of 1968, § 902, 18 U.S.C. § 925(d)(3) (1988).
5. Franklyn E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 133, 134 (1975); Harold W. Glassen, Firearms Control: A Matter of Distinction, 8
TRIAL, Jan.-Feb. 1972, at 52, 54.
6. Paul Cotton, Gun Associated Violence Viewed Increasingly as Public Health Challenge, 26
JAMA 1171, 1172 (1992).
7. Erik Larson, The Story of A Gun, THE ATLANTIC, Jan. 1993, at 48, 49.
8. 139 CONG. REC. S612 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1993) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
9. Id.
10. Larson, supra note 7, at 49.
11. Although imprecise, estimates derived from 1988 hospital discharge data indicate
that for every firearm fatality there were more than seven non-fatal gun-related inju-
ries. Cotton, supra note 6, at 1172.
12. This is Moynihan's estimate. 139 CONG. REC., supra note 8, at 5612. Other estimates
of annual gunshot injuries are substantially smaller. Cotton for example, estimates that
70,000 people were hospitalized for serious gun-related injuries during 1988. Cotton, supra
note 6, at 1172.
13. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., 2 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIM. JUST. STAT., CRIM.
VICTIMIZATION IN THE U.S., annual table no. 298 (1991).
14. Larson, supra note 7, at 49.
15. Id. at 49-50.
16. One three-year-old, shot through the rectum, endured a colostomy. An eight-
year-old girl shot through the head was institutionalized for life. Id.
17. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., UNIFORM CRIME REP., CRIME IN THE U.S. 283 (1991). Just as chil-
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Although these statistics should kindle outrage in a stone, they have failed to
rescue the issue of firearm violence from legislative inertia. Congress has not inter-
vened with comprehensive gun control legislation for over 25 years."
Given this long period of congressional malaise, the abrupt appearance of firearm
legislation as novel and aggressive as Senator Moynihan's bullet ban properly merits
close attention. The strategy of the legislation is broadly innovative: it seeks to wrest
away the great American gun debate from the repetitive dialogue of the past two de-
cades by restating the problem in different terms. No longer an instrumental function
of the bad gun or a criminological problem of the bad user, the problem of firearm
violence in America is recast as a crisis of public health, an unrivaled epidemic of
"bullet-death" and "bullet-injury" susceptible to an epidemiological diagnosis and a
scientific cure. 9 Specifically, Moynihan frames the issue in terms of an epidemiologi-
cal (with firearm-related death and injury as the "epidemic" or "disease") triad: violent
behavior is the "environment" in which the gun-related injury occurs; the shooting
victim is the "host", and bullets are the "pathogens" or "agents of injury" which must
be eliminated through the "cure" of stringent legal controls.'
Moynihan's reasoning begins with a repudiation of the dominant regulatory strat-
egies of the past. In his eyes, user-based restrictions must fail because the problem of
violent behavior is entrenched in deeper sociological problems that are not amenable to
legislative solutions: "The environment in which these deaths and injuries occur is
complex. Many factors likely contribute to the rise in bullet-related injury .... We
simply cannot do much to change the environment in which gun-related injury occurs,
nor do we know how."
21
Weapon-based strategies which seek to remove certain problematic firearms from
the marketplace are similarly futile given the vast inventory of arms already currently
deployed in the society at large: "There are some 200 million firearms in circulation.
The pistol is a simple machine, and with minimal care it remains working for centu-
ries."22 In other words, Moynihan contends that society is so saturated with guns that
firearm violence would continue unabated even if the government effectively shut
down the manufacture and sale of all new arms tomorrow.
According to the Senator, the solution to this gun control quandary is to regulate
dren were being shot during the 1980's so too were they doing much of the shooting.
Department of Justice analysts recorded an unprecedented surge in juvenile violent crime
and weapons violations commencing in the early 1980's. Id. In 1990, there were 151 ar-
rests per 100,000 juveniles for weapons offenses-the highest rate ever recorded. Id. One
recent study of 11,000 teens from ten states found that forty-one percent of the boys
and twenty-one percent of the girls said they could obtain a handgun whenever they
wished. Larson, supra note 7, at 50.
18. Federal legislation in the area of firearms controls has been limited to relative-
ly minor amendments of the Gun Control Act of 1968. Title II, section 13 of the Omnibus
Crime Control Act of 1970 amended § 924(c) of title 18 to impose a mandatory sentence
of one to ten years for federal crimes in which a firearm is used or carried unlawfully.
The Law Enforcement Officers' Protection Act amended the 1968 Act to prohibit the man-
ufacture, importation and sale of armor-piercing ammunition. Pub. L. No. 99-408, 100 Stat.
920 (1986), infra note 34.
19. 139 CONG. REC., supra note 8, at S612-13.
20. Id. at S612-13. According to Moynihan, this framework finds its inspiration in the
Motor Vehicle Safety Act, in which the Senator was heavily involved and which was
similarly steeped in an epidemiological idiom. Id. at S613.
21. 138 CONG. REc. S18,162-63 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
22. 139 CONG. REc., supra note 8, at S613.
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the bullets that actually result in death and injury. Unlike the intractable problem of
violent behavior, commerce in ammunition is readily amenable to legislative con-
trols-bullets can be banned or taxed into obsolescence. Moreover, unlike the nation's
inexhaustible supply of guns, there is, at any given time, only a four-year supply of
bullets maintained in factory, commercial or household inventories.23 Although the
impact of the ammunition ban will be cumulative, the regulatory end in view is a
nation of empty guns by sometime early in the next century.
This article evaluates the efficacy of ammunition controls as a new regulatory
strategy. Part II focuses on the specific, selective ammunition restrictions employed in
the Moynihan bills. This section examines the regulatory logic of the proposed legisla-
tion, focusing on Moynihan's theory of guns as all-too-durable goods and the princi-
ples of selection informing Moynihan's choice of regulated calibers.
First, I argue that the Senator's theory of diminishing ammunition supplies is
flawed to the extent that it relies on the assumption that the regulated classes of am-
munition will continue to be expended at current, pre-regulation rates. The success of
the strategy depends, in part, on whether gun owners affected by the proposed legisla-
tion will stockpile or conserve sufficient ammunition to ensure that their handguns will
be loaded and available for self-defense or other purposes. I suggest that while
Moynihan's legislation is likely to drive certain weapons off the firing range, it is
unlikely to significantly reduce the number of loaded, functioning handguns maintained
in household inventories and available for impetuous acts of violence.
Second, I observe that even if one assumes Moynihan's bullet bans will gradual-
ly deplete inventories of affected firearms, the effectiveness of the legislation is likely
to be undermined by changing fads in weapons selection. The cumulative effect of
these selective restrictions may eventually disable the firearms that Moynihan identifies
as problematic, but there is no guarantee that criminals will not first adopt other,
equally deadly weapons to accomplish their purposes.
Third, I explore the closely related problems associated with the Senator's ad
hoc approach to identifying regulatory targets. Moynihan's choice of regulated calibers
relies on the current street reputations of a few popular handguns rather than concrete
principles of ballistic performance or mechanical design. This regulatory approach may
prove self-defeating to the extent that it will not reduce the availability of other, equal-
ly problematic weapons and cartridges.
Part III looks past the specific features of the Moynihan legislation to some of
the broader implications of ammunition controls and suggests how such controls might
be more profitably exploited in future, more comprehensive firearms legislation. Here,
I argue that selective ammunition restrictions are unlikely to succeed where they are
adopted as independent, exclusive regulatory alternatives to traditional gun control
strategies. Instead, ammunition controls and weapon restrictions must compete on
equal footing, as dual components of a balanced regulatory scheme that strikes at both
the existing inventory weapons and the market for new guns. Part III concludes with
several specific proposals, based on mutually reinforcing weapon and ammunition
restrictions, that may dramatically reduce the problem of firearm violence in our com-
munities.
23. 138 CONG. REC., supra note 21, at S18,162-63.
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II. THE MOYNIHAN LEGISLATION
The substance and structure of the legislation is quite simple. Moynihan proposes
that Congress elect between an outright ban and prohibitive taxes as a means of regu-
lating a narrow range of centerfire handgun ammunition. These legislative alternatives
are embodied in three separate bills.
Senate Bill 178' (S. 178), entitled the Violent Crime Prevention Act (of 1993),
proposes to amend chapter 44 of title 18, United States Code, to "prohibit the manu-
facture, transfer, or importation of .25 caliber, .32 caliber and 9 millimeter ammuni-
tion."' This bill operates as a direct ban on all commerce in the proscribed calibers
of ammunition, with special law enforcement exemptions for federal, state and local
agencies.'
Alternatively, Senate Bill 17927 (S. 179), the Real Cost of Ammunition Act,
would achieve substantially the same results by imposing a 1000-percent sales tax on
the regulated calibers.28 S. 179 similarly exempts transactions in ammunition entered
into by law enforcement agencies. 9 Although the issues raised by these alternative
regulatory pathways differ to some degree-for example, taxation may entail greater
risks of black market activity than an outright ban-these differences are marginal to
the concerns of this article. S. 178 and S. 179 are identical in their regulatory logic and
objectives. For purposes of this discussion they will be treated interchangeably.
Senate Bill 1616' (S. 1616), the Real Cost of Handgun Ammunition Act, intro-
duced in November 1993, differs in several important respects from its predecessors,
S. 178 and S. 179. The bill contains three components. First, it would raise the federal
excise tax on all centerfire handgun ammunition3 from eleven to fifty percent.32
Second, it would impose a $10,000 "occupational tax" on importers and manufacturers
of handgun ammunition, 3  and third, it would impose a 10,000-percent excise tax on
two peculiarly lethal handgun rounds-Winchester's hollow point 9mm "Black Talon"
cartridge and the .50 caliber "Desert Eagle."'
Senate Bill 1616 was conceived of, at least in part, as a revenue-making measure
and was drafted for purposes of inclusion in the Clinton Health Care Plan,35 which
arrived in Senator Moynihan's Finance Committee in the Fall of 1993. The stated
purpose of the general excise tax is to bring the cost of ammunition in line with the
24. S. 178, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. S. 179, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. S. 1616, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
31. Handgun ammunition is defined as any centerfire ammunition that has a cartridge
case of less than 1.3 inches in length, which is to say, it is not rifle ammunition. Ac-
cording to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, this definition precisely tar-
gets all handgun ammunition except .22 caliber rimfire, which is the primary round used
for target shooting and in sporting competitions. Rifle ammunition would not be affected.
139 CONG. REc. S14,958 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
32. Id.
33. Id. at S14,959.
34. Mass mail letter from Senator Moynihan (undated but received March 1994) (on
file with the Journal of Legislation).
35. 139 CONG. REC., supra note 31.
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costs it imposes on society.36 Moynihan contemplates that the money generated by the
new excise and occupational taxes could be incorporated into the revenue stream for a
comprehensive federal health care program.
This article will focus only on the regulatory, as opposed to the revenue-making,
aspects of S. 1616. To the extent that the excise tax provisions of S. 1616 simply
represent one of many alternative proposals for financing the Clinton Health Care Plan,
they are remote to the interests of this inquiry. By comparison, the prohibitive 10,000-
percent taxation of the Black Talon and .50 caliber ammunition is purely regulatory in
nature. Like S. 179, this measure frankly proposes to tax the covered ammunition out
of existence. The regulatory component of S. 1616 will be evaluated in conjunction
with selective ammunition bans contemplated by S. 178 and S. 179.
A. Guns as All-Too-Durable Goods and Moynihan's Theory of Diminishing
Supply
Stated in summary, the Moynihan bullet bills strive to reduce levels of firearm-
inflicted death and injury by gradually rendering obsolete the weapons most frequently
used in the commission of violent crimes. The strength of his proposal relies heavily
on the insight that while handguns are all-too-durable goods capable of repeated use
over many decades, they must rely on a depletable inventory of cartridges which must
be discarded after each shot. Moynihan estimates that there are some 7.5 billion rounds
of ammunition in circulation.3" Consumed at a current rate of about two billion car-
tridges per year, this inventory amounts to roughly a four-year supply of bullets.38
Therefore, in the Senator's view, it must follow that if you freeze the supply of ammu-
nition, you will effectively put the guns that rely on such ammunition out of commis-
sion over the course of three to five years.
Moynihan's theory is only as sound as its central assumption that people will
continue to expend the restricted ammunition at current, pre-regulation rates. Modem
pistol cartridges, which are simple amalgams of lead, brass, sulfur, and steel, are dura-
ble items. The shelf-life of these cartridges is scarcely shorter than that of the weapons
that concerned the Senator in the first place. Unless discharged or carelessly exposed
to rust and oxidation, these cartridges, like the handguns that fire them, will remain
functional for many decades.
Although any estimation of future use is necessarily speculative, simple market
principles dictate that consumption of the regulated calibers will decline as soon as the
market for the regulated ammunition is closed. Gun owners will surely realize, as the
Senator does, that their weapons are only useful so long as they are loaded. Currently,
only a small fraction of the cartridges expended each year are used for violent purpos-
es. The balance is released in the field and firing range for purposes of hunting, com-
petition, casual target shooting, and firearms training. While these recreational uses of
the regulated calibers are likely to decline, it is unclear that there will be significantly
fewer loaded weapons on hand for impetuous acts of violence.
The bullet ban would tend to frustrate the purposes of the first-time gun buyer
who enters the market with criminal intentions, but only to the extent that his choices
36. Letter from Senator Moynihan, supra note 34.
37. 139 CONG. REC., supra note 8, at S613.
38. Id.
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are limited to weapons chambered in the regulated calibers. Moreover, the thrust of
this legislation goes to handgun ownership, not handgun availability. Moynihan's stated
purpose is to disable the weapons he considers to be the most threatening among the
67 million handguns already in circulation. The Senator concedes that the effects of
the legislation would be cumulative, but it is unclear just how long it will be necessary
to wait. More importantly, it is possible that the purposes of a slowly cumulating
weapons ban may be overtaken by the natural flux of fad and fashion in weapons
selection.39 Significantly, none of the calibers strongly associated with violent crime
today were identified as especially problematic in 1973. What calibers and weapons
will be favored by criminals in the year 2010?
B. Principles of Selection
Perhaps the most striking and problematic feature of the Moynihan bills is their
limited scope. This legislation constitutes a selective rather than a comprehensive regu-
lation of firearm ammunition. These bills seek to regulate only five of twenty-five
popular centerfire handgun cartridges currently available in today's market.' Why
should Congress suppress the manufacture and sale of these particular calibers while
leaving commerce in all other ammunition unmolested? Moynihan's reasons are three.
First, he contends that at least three of these rounds-the .25, .32 and 9mm
cartridges-are disproportionately responsible for bullet-related death and injury.4 In
support of this proposition, he observes that while these "three rounds compose only
thirteen percent of licensed guns in New York City ... they are involved in one-third
of all homicides,"42 and nearly a quarter of all police shootings.43
Second, he suggests that .25 and .32 caliber cartridges are principally used as
fodder for "Saturday night specials" - cheap, easily concealed handguns that are the
favorite choice of street criminals.' Nine millimeter rounds are similarly reviled as
the ammunition used in assault weapons and in the semi-automatic handguns favored
by drug dealers.4
Third, Moynihan contends that these cartridges have no sporting or hunting ap-
plication but are designed exclusively for violence.'
39. Franklyn E. Zimring, The Problem of Assault Firearms, 35 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 538,
543 (1989) [hereinafter Zimring, Assault Firearms] (recognizing that changing fads in weap-
ons selection is a significant element in the problem of violent crime in America).
40. FRANK C. BARNES, CARTRIDGES OF THE WORLD, 255 (Ken Warner ed.. 6th ed. 1993).
41. 139 CONG. REC., supra note 8, at S613.
42. 138 CONG. REC., supra note 21, at S18,162-63.
43. 137 CONG. REc. 5690 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1991) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
44. 135 CONG. REC. E1003 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1989) (statement of Rep. Weiss).
45. 137 CONG. REC. S10,070 (daily ed. July 16, 1991) (statement of Sen. Moynihan)
(1993).
46. 138 CONG. REC., supra note 21, at S18,162-63. While these three factors appear to
account for Moynihan's principles of inclusion, the Senator is much less clear about
what principles of exclusion, if any, he applied to his selection of regulated calibers. For
example, the .22 rimfire and .38 special are probably the two " most popular handgun
rounds in the United States, yet they are conspicuously absent from the Senator's list
of proscribed calibers. The .22 is scarcely less powerful than the .25; yet it is cheaper to
buy, easier to fire accurately and more often employed in inexpensive, readily-conceal-
able pocket pistols than any of the regulated calibers. In 1981, .22 caliber bullets fired
from John Hinckley's auto-loading pocket pistol wounded President Reagan, permanently
disabled his press secretary, James Brady, and injured two secret service agents. Accord-
ing to an aide in Moynihan's office the .22 rimfire was responsible for one in four shoot-
19941
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The problems Moynihan identifies can be characterized as either functional or
sociological, depending on whether they are identified with a specific feature of the
ammunition itself or, rather, associated with the people who use it. Functional com-
plaints can be further divided into (1) problems inherent in the design or ballistic per-
formance of the cartridges themselves, and (2) problems stemming from the design or
mechanical features of the weapons in which the cartridges are used.
Although these categories will sometimes overlap, the distinctions are useful for
measuring the regulatory efficiency or "fit" between the means and ends of the pro-
posed legislative scheme. For example, the regulatory fit of a selective bullet ban is at
its tightest when it turns on some unique functional characteristic of the proscribed
cartridge that distinguishes it from other ammunition and justifies special legal con-
trols. The armor-piercing "cop-killer bullet" of recent infamy-a hardened lead slug
encased in a thick jacket of steel, brass, or hard tungsten alloys-serves as such an
example." By comparison, a selective ammunition ban based on some mechanical
feature of the component weapon may be less efficient, as its purpose will be under-
mined to the extent that other unregulated weapons share the same offensive feature.
Similarly, "sociological" ammunition controls which target certain cartridges and weap-
ons because they are favored by criminal users may only be effective to the extent that
such users cannot find other, equally threatening means of accomplishing their ends.
1. Functional Complaints
a. Ballistic Characteristics
All bullets are lethal, but some bullets are deadlier than others. Like a knife, a
48 fobullet kills by inflicting penetration trauma. Apart from the site of injury, a bullet's
deadliness is largely dependent upon the size and depth of the resulting wound tract. A
bullet's lethality is also related to its force impact. High-velocity, high-energy bullets
set up shock waves and often cause cavitation effects, resulting in unpredictable dam-
age at sites far from the wound tract.49 Serious wounds still occur with low-velocity,
low-energy rounds, "but the damage is localized to the tissues adjacent to the wound
tract, and the full extent of the injury can usually be determined at the time of sur-
ings in New York City during 1989. Why was this round excluded? Probably because of
its wide range of sporting applications and long-gun interchangeability. The omission of
the .38 special is more difficult to explain. Potent, compact, and widely used, the .38
would seem to be a good candidate for restrictions aimed at reducing the existing inven-
tory of functioning handguns. Perhaps the .38 was spared because of its historically
strong law enforcement constituency. However, if popularity among law enforcement
officers should save a cartridge from regulation, Senator Moynihan should reconsider
the 9mm cartridge which has recently become the caliber of choice among major metro-
politan police departments. See note 66, infra, and accompanying text.
47. 137 CONG. REC., supra note 43, at S689. The Law Enforcement Officers Protection
Act, banning the importation and sale of armor-piercing ammunition, was signed into law
by President Reagan in the summer of 1986. 139 CONG. REC. S549 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1993)
(statement of Sen. Moynihan). Narrowly focused and relatively uncontroversial, the cop-
killer bullet act enjoyed broad, bipartisan support in the 99th Congress and passed with
the tacit approval of the National Rifle Association. Id. It comes as no surprise that
Senator Moynihan and his House sponsors are marketing each of the current bullet bans
as sequels to this popular legislation.
48. Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association, Assault Weapons as a
Public Health Hazard in the United States, 267 JAMA 3067, 3068-70 (1992).
49. Id.
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gery. ' 5
The ballistic characteristics of the various cartridges proscribed under the
Moynihan bills fail to fully account for their special selection as regulatory targets.
Clearly, two of the rounds-the Black Talon and the .50 caliber Desert Eagle-have
uniquely dangerous functional characteristics that distinguish them from most other
types of ammunition and invite special controls. However, the ballistic character of the
other regulated cartridges proves more difficult to separate from broad categories of
unregulated ammunition that would be freely available after the Moynihan ban went
into effect.
The Black Talon bullet has a special "barbed" configuration designed to expand
the size of wound tracts and maximize tissue trauma. When the Talon is fired into the
body, tiny metal wings or barbs peel away from a lead core, expanding the diameter of
the wound tract and exposing sharp edges that tear through soft-tissues and organs.
One gun magazine described the effect of the Black Talon round as follows:
[The bullet expands] to expose razor-sharp reinforced jacket petals. These cut tissue
in the wake of the penetrating core. Toward the end of the bullet travel, the Talon
bullet typically turns sideways .... From this point on, it penetrates soft tissue
like a throwing star-very nasty; very effective; a real improvement in handgun
ammo.
5
'
The .50 caliber Desert Eagle has similarly destructive characteristics that distin-
guish it from other handgun cartridges. It is an enormously powerful, high-velocity,
armor-piercing round manufactured for use in tank-mounted machine guns that has
been adapted for use in a few foreign made handguns.52
Like the armor-piercing cop-killer bullet, the Black Talon and the .50 caliber
Desert Eagle cartridges are best understood as special cases; their ballistic character
poses unique dangers that are effectively addressed by the selective ban contemplated
under S. 1616. However, like the cop-killer bullet act, Moynihan's Black Talon and
.50 caliber prohibitions follow along in the tradition of the earlier machine-gun and
Saturday-night-special legislation measures that solved comparatively small problems
at a small price without driving to the heart of the larger problem of firearm violence
in America.
The unique functional attributes that justify special controls in the case of the
Talon and Desert Eagle cartridges are wholly lacking in the other calibers subject to
regulation under the Moynihan bills. Purely in terms of their ballistic specifications,
the calibers regulated under S. 178 and S. 179 are demonstrably less dangerous, and
less "lethal," than most other calibers in the spectrum of modem handgun ammunition.
Compared to virtually every other centerfire pistol cartridge, the .25 is a pip-squeak
round. The energy it delivers at any range is quite low,53 and its slender, jacketed slug
inevitably results in a very narrow wound tract. The .25 is considered inadequate for
hunting anything larger than a squirrel or a rat, and it is generally unsuitable for seri-
ous self-defense.' In the crudest terms, the difference between getting hit squarely
50. Id.
51. 139 CONG. REc. S14,958-59 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (Sen. Moynihan reading from
HANDGUNS FOR SPORT & DEFENSE magazine).
52. Id.
53. BARNES, supra note 40, at 220.
54. Id.
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with a .25 and, say, a .44 magnum is roughly analogous to the difference between
falling off a ladder and falling off a bridge-a rather short ladder, a very tall bridge.
Measured in foot-pounds, the striking power of the .44 caliber cartridge is twenty
times greater than that of the diminutive .25."
The .32 caliber round is somewhat more formidable than the tiny .25. However,
it is about the minimum size that can be seriously considered for self-defense, and its
ballistic stature is dwarfed by several popular handgun cartridges that the Moynihan
legislation would leave untouched. For example, a factory-loaded .32 caliber cartridge
produces 145 foot-pounds of muzzle energy, compared to 450 foot-pounds for the .45
ACP and 935 -foot-pounds for the .357 magnum. 6 The .32 has been uniformly reject-
ed for police and military use in the United States. However, it has a stronger law en-
forcement constituency in Europe, where it also serves as an alternate (but unofficial)
caliber for military sidearms.5"
The 9mm cartridge is substantially more powerful than either the .25 or the .32.
Historically, it has proven to be the world's most popular military handgun cartridge;
however, it is currently considered by law enforcement and military analysts to be the
lightest of several calibers generally acceptable for combat or anti-personnel purposes.
Depending on which bullet-weight is selected, the 9mm cartridge will typically gener-
ate between 332 and 408 foot-pounds of muzzle energy-a rating only good enough to
reach the middle of the ballistic range for handgun rounds."8
The search for a coherent regulatory principle among these numbers avails noth-
ing. The ballistic performance of these three regulated rounds simply does not justify
their selection for special legal controls.59
b. Weapon Specifications
While there is nothing uniquely problematic about the potentially regulated am-
munition, the weapons chambered in these calibers do present certain troublesome
features. The diminutive size and relatively low power of the .25 and the .32 make
these rounds unusually suitable for small, semi-automatic pocket pistols. Virtually all
of the handguns chambered in these calibers tend to be very concealable and feature
relatively high magazine capacities. Most are of high quality although several are of
cheap manufacture.' Therefore, although there is nothing especially menacing about
the cartridges themselves, it could be fairly said that the characteristics that qualify
handguns for their unique role in homicide and violent crime are especially pronounced
55. Assuming standard factory loads, the .25 auto delivers 71 foot-pounds of muzzle
energy. The .44 magnum delivers 1496 foot-pounds. Id. at 354.
56. Id. at 225, 354.
57. Id. at 225.
58. Id. at 233.
59. Of course nothing in this section is meant to minimize the danger of these or any
handgun cartridges. Like all bullets, these rounds can and do kill. The significance of
these finer distinctions among muzzle energies, bullet dimensions and all the other yard-
sticks used to measure performance in the ballistics lab is quickly lost when any gun is
fired at a human being. Surely, such distinctions would be lost on Presidents Lincoln
and McKinley, both of whom lost their lives to assassins' .32s.
60. GUN DIGEST 273-300 (Ken Warner ed., 47th ed. 1993). There are currently 25
models of small (measuring 7 inches or less in total length), auto-loading .25 or .32
caliber handguns available on the new gun market. Id. Prices range from $54.95 for a
QF1 model SA25 Pistol, id. at 290, to $1000 for a German Walther PP Auto, id. at 299.
Eight of these weapons retail for under $100. Id. at 273-300.
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in the case of most handguns chambered in .25s and .32s,
However, many other weapons present the same problematic features, and the
logic of the Moynihan legislation fails to account for this similarity. On the current
market for new firearms, one can choose among at least thirty-seven different models
of auto-loading pocket pistols measuring six inches or less in total length and featuring
magazine capacities of six rounds or more.6' Seventeen of these weapons are cham-
bered in either the .25 or .32 caliber; thirteen are chambered in .22 rimfire calibers;
and seven are chambered in the .380 ACP.62 Nine of the seventeen models chambered
in the .25 and .32 calibers are also manufactured in at least one other unregulated
caliber.63 In all, the availability of twenty-one models of highly-concealable automatic
handguns which are functionally and often literally identical to those chambered in the
regulated calibers would be wholly unaffected by this legislation.' Moynihan's spe-
cial regulatory focus on the .25 and .32 caliber weapons seems misplaced to the extent
that his legislation will not disturb commerce in these equally problematic handguns.
The 9mm presents a different picture. Introduced nearly a century ago in
Bismarck's Germany, this caliber is still sold under its original denomination,
parabellum-"for war." Handguns chambered in this round are exclusively auto-load-
ers and typically feature magazine capacities of fifteen to nineteen rounds. Berretta
9mm handguns were adopted as the official officer's sidearm in all branches of the
United States military in 1985, and similar weapons are carried in most of the NATO
forces.' Nine millimeter guns have recently attracted a large and enthusiastic law
enforcement constituency. These handguns have largely replaced the .38 service re-
volver as the sidearm of choice in most metropolitan police departments.'
Despite their military origin and character, 9mm handguns are functionally indis-
tinguishable from most other large-frame semi-automatic centerfire handguns. More-
over, like the majority of .25 and .32 caliber handguns, many 9mm models are simul-
taneously manufactured in one or more comparable calibers that would be unaffected
by the Moynihan restrictions.67
The 9mm, however, is also chambered in a rash of semi-automatic sub-machine
pistols that are functionally unique. Designed primarily for close combat, these para-
military weapons are generally quite compact; they have enormous magazine capacities
and are capable of discharging a large number of rounds in a very short time frame.
While many of these weapons-commonly known as "assault pistols"-are purchased
for collection, self-defense, combat competitions or plinking, they cannot be fairly
characterized as sporting weapons." Prompted by growing concern among law en-
forcement agencies concerning the enormous fire-power of these weapons, President
Bush issued an executive order banning the import of most foreign-made, semi-auto-
61. Id. at 273-300.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. BARNES, supra note 40, at 233.
66. Id. at 215, 233, 254.
67. Of the sixty 9nmn handgun models sold today, twenty are offered in identical
clones chambered in rounds such as the .380 ACP. 10mm and .41 Smith and Wesson Auto.
GUN DIGEST, supra note 60, at 277-300.
68. This judgment is consistent with the ATF's official classification of these weapons
as "military-style" small arms. See 139 CONG. REc. S548 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1993) (statement
of Sen. Moynihan)'
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matic assault pistols on March 14, 1989.9 Earlier this year, Senator Moynihan intro-
duced Senate Bill 108,7" a bill which would permanently codify this executive prohi-
bition under 18 U.S.C. § 925(d)(3).71
Unlike most of the other weapons implicated by the Moynihan ban, virtually all
of the firearms fitting the description of an assault pistol are exclusively chambered for
the 9mm cartridge. The regulatory logic of an ammunition ban premised purely on the
functional characteristics of the component weapon would seem to make more sense in
the case of the 9mm.
72
However, as a matter of mechanical design, assault pistols are not intrinsically
bound to the 9mm cartridge. Other centerfire handgun rounds would function equally
well in such weapons. The 10mm Auto and the .40 Smith & Wesson Auto are Johnny-
come-lately cartridges steadily gaining popularity on the auto-loading handgun market.
Both rounds are physically similar but ballistically superior to the 9mm cartridge, and
both have proven to be compatible with a wide range of handgun models formerly
chambered only in 9mm. There is every reason to expect that these increasingly popu-
lar rounds will be embraced as an alternative to the 9mm by manufacturers of assault
pistols as well. Additionally, the .45 ACP and .30 caliber carbine-yesteryear's leading
military cartridges-are also obvious conversion candidates.
2. Sociological Complaints
Neither the functional attributes of the regulated calibers nor the characteristics
of the weapons in which they are used appear to account for the principles of selection
informing this legislative scheme. Perhaps the key is hidden within the Senator's socio-
logical assumptions.
Moynihan's regulatory themes suggest nothing so strongly as the image of a
criminal user class. The .25 and the .32 are the calibers disproportionately employed
by street criminals7" and cop killers.74 The 9mm is favored by violent street gangs
and drug dealers." However, Moynihan's evidence is somewhat thin: one in ten hand-
guns recovered from New York City crime scenes during 1989 were 9mm.76 During
the same year, .25's and .32's were involved in over one-quarter of New York City's
police shootings.77
While these numbers give us some idea of weapon selection patterns in New
York City, the national picture is more difficult to discern. This difficulty is largely
due to the lack of any systematic federal record keeping on the types of firearms and
calibers involved in violent crimes. Currently, the most reliable record on the criminal
use of weapons by type is derived from a database of trace requests submitted to the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) by law enforcement agencies seek-
69. Id.
70. S. 108, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
71. Id.
72. Each of the five weapons identified by Moynihan as assault pistols for purposes
of the import restrictions contained in S. 108 are chambered in the 9mm.
73. 137 CONG. REC. S10,070 (daily ed. July 16, 1991) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
74. See 137 CONG. REC., supra note 43, at S690.
75. Id.
76. Sam Roberts, Controlling Guns: One Idea Starts With The Bullets, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6,
1990 at B1.
77. 138 CONG. REC., supra note 21, at S18,162-3.
[Vol. 20:19
Moynihan Bullet Bills
ing to identify stolen guns or guns known to be associated with specific crimes.
Unfortunately, police departments across the country tend to vary in the frequen-
cy with which they request traces, and in the crime characteristics and weapon attrib-
utes that prompt such requests." As a result, the sample of firearms for which traces
are requested is not likely to be representative of all firearms used in crimes. Despite
these limitations, the BATF data provides a crude approximation of the frequency with
which criminals choose general types of weapons. According to this information, sixty-
two percent of all traces requests submitted between January 1988 and March 1989
involved handguns, of which twenty-nine percent were auto-loaders and thirty-three
percent revolvers.79 Assault weapons, both foreign and domestic, were associated with
roughly ten percent of all traces and only 8.4 percent of gun traces for homicides
during this same period,"°
Curiously, the single firearm most frequently traced to violent crimes committed
during the last two years would not be affected by this legislation. The weapon in
question is not chambered in any of the regulated calibers; it is neither particularly
cheap, nor particularly concealable. It is not even an auto-loader. The culprit? The
Smith & Wesson revolver.1
Even assuming that Moynihan's ammunition ban correctly targets firearms
disproportionately associated with crime, the purposes of this legislation will only be
realized to the extent that the criminal users cannot easily adopt equally dangerous
unregulated weapons. In other words, if the real difference between the handguns
singled out for special restrictions and other semi-automatic handguns is the people
who are using them, what is to stop them from switching to other semi-automatic
weapons?
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, there is nothing especially distinctive
about either the regulated calibers or, by and large, the weapons in which they are
chambered. Surely, some cheap and readily concealable pocket pistols would eventual-
ly be disabled by the selective restrictions these bills contemplate. However, most of
these weapons would be unaffected in the first place, and, more importantly, nothing in
this legislation would restrict the continuing availability of cheap, easily concealable
handguns.
Similarly, these bills could reasonably be expected to slowly reduce the numbers
of functioning 9mm handguns in circulation. However the vast majority of auto-load-
ing handguns would be wholly unaffected by this ban, and virtually identical weapons
chambered for even more powerful cartridges would continue to be freely available.
Given these severe limitations in scope and effect, it is difficult to see how this legisla-
tion would present anything more than a mild inconvenience for anyone intent on
obtaining a handgun for violent or criminal purposes.
C. Selective Ammunition Controls and "The New Gun Hypothesis"
The legislation's slow and uncertain cumulative effect, combined with the contin-
uing availability of substantially similar unregulated firearms, presents significant prob-
lems which become all the more acute in light of studies suggesting that most firearm
78. Cotton, supra note 6, at 1174.
79. Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 48, at 3068.
80. Id.
81. Larson, supra note 7, at 50.
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violence is committed with new or nearly new weapons. Records of firearms confiscat-
ed in New York City indicate that fifty-eight percent of all handguns used in urban
crime are purchased within three years of their use in a criminal offense. 2 Confisca-
tion of older weapons sharply declined in proportion to each successive year in circula-
tion.83
Other data suggest that the supply of new handguns correlates more closely to
trends in firearm violence than levels of aggregate handgun ownership.' Both studies
strongly indicate that newer guns are more "at risk" than older weapons, and that
regulations aimed at reducing the supply of new handguns will have a greater impact
on gun violence than efforts to reduce general levels of ownership. The Moynihan bills
explicitly contemplate restrictions on handgun ownership rather than handgun availabil-
ity, and they exclusively target older weapons in the existing inventory of handguns.
Such a regulatory strategy is not likely to succeed under the "new guns thesis."
The Senator concedes that his legislation will not eliminate "handgun killings"
and street crimes, but simply contends that "it just might reduce them."' The magni-
tude of this reduction proves difficult to estimate. In his introductory statements to
these bills, Moynihan speculates that "[a] thirty-percent reduction in bullet-related
deaths, for instance, would save over 10,000 lives each year and prevent up to 50,000
wounds." 6 Unfortunately, nothing suggests that this legislation would result in such a
reduction.
Elsewhere, the Senator contends that even a single life saved from violent crime
is worth the legislative effort. 7 This argument is not without moral force. However,
one must recognize that Congress might pass any amount of arbitrary and ill-advised
legislation each year that would save at least some lives. For example, lung cancer
rivals firearm violence as a leading cause of death in America, and tobacco smoke is
the principal cause of lung cancer. A selective ban of the most popular brands of ciga-
rettes-say, Marlboros and Camels-might rescue some lives from the disease, but
such an oblique and underinclusive measure could hardly be considered good legisla-
tion. Most smokers will simply switch to other brands. Congress might similarly tackle
the problem of alcoholism by banning cheap red wines and malt-liquors, or address
highway speeding by banning the Chevrolet Camaro.
However crude and imperfect, these analogies demonstrate with cigarettes and
cars the regulatory dangers of indirection and underinclusiveness that are equally appli-
cable in the case of cartridges and firearms. The Moynihan bullet ban is indirect inso-
far as it seeks to regulate problems that are not inherent in the ammunition itself, but
are rooted in the mechanical characteristics of the weapons in which they are used, and
in the criminal behavior of the user class that selects them. In this sense, Moynihan's
regulatory emphasis on ammunition is best understood as a legislative sleight-of-
hand-an attempt to do indirectly with a bullet ban what Congress has so long lacked
the political will to do directly by banning ordinary handguns. Moreover, the Senator's
legislation is underinclusive insofar as it would not restrict all classes of weapons that
82. Zimring, supra note 5, at 174.
83. Id. ("newer handguns are more 'at risk' [for confiscation] than older handguns")
84. Id. at 195-96.
85. 139 CONG. REc., supra note 8, at S612; 137 CONG. REC., supra note 45, at S10,070.
86. Id.
87. 137 CONG. REc., supra note 45, at S10,070.
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possess the mechanical capabilities giving rise to their criminal cachet.
IH. PROBLEMS IN THE PAST, PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE
Two legislative precedents in the area of gun-control law demonstrate the prob-
lems associated with Moynihan's regulatory strategy. First is the failure of President
Bush's executive prohibition on imported assault weapons to restrict the availability of
assault weapons generally or reduce their involvement in violent crime.88 The second
is the similar failure of the 1968 Saturday-night-special legislation to curb the criminal
use of cheap, easily concealable handguns.
Both measures were unsuccessful largely because Congress interposed a selective
rather than a general ban that impacted only a few models within a general class of
problematic weaponry. Specifically, both restrictions failed to recognize that domesti-
cally-manufactured assault rifles and Saturday night specials were just as deadly as
their foreign counterparts. Domestic manufacture of assault weapons surged after the
imposition of the 1989 executive restriction, mirroring a similar spike in the domestic
production of compact handguns in the wake of the 1968 legislation.89 Why were the
authors of this legislation blind to these obvious dangers? Probably because they tend-
ed to define assault weapons and Saturday night specials in an ad hoc way.'
Moreover, the authors of both the 1968 and 1989 measures failed to anticipate
the technical ease and facility with which gun makers, both foreign and domestic,
could restore the market gaps temporarily opened by these selective restrictions. This
phenomenon was first demonstrated when foreign gun manufacturers successfully
skirted many of the Saturday-night-special restrictions by shipping massive quantities
of cheap handgun parts to the United States for domestic reassembly and sale.91 More
recently, many foreign assault weapon manufacturers have similarly circumvented the
strictures of the Bush ban by reconfiguring their weapons and shipping them out under
different model numbers.92
The lessons of these ineffectual legislative efforts are readily applicable to the
Moynihan bills insofar as they: (1) select their regulatory targets on an ad hoc basis,
relying more on the current street reputation of a few notorious guns than concrete
principles of ballistic performance or mechanical design; (2) fail to circumscribe a
burgeoning inventory of functionally identical or superior weapons and cartridges; and
(3) ignore the demonstrated capacity of gun manufacturers to evade selective weapon
bans through rapid modification and conversion of regulated arms.
These problems point to three proposals for improving the quality of future am-
88. Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 48, at 3072.
89. Kirk Johnson, Assault Rifles: Despite Curb, No Shortage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1989 at
AI-10 (describing the failure of Bush's import ban to impact the availability of assault
weapons).
90. See Zimring, Assault Firearms, supra note 39, at 542-43, for an incisive analysis of
the ad hoc quality of both the 1968 Saturday-night-special legislation and more recent
legislative efforts to define and regulate assault weapons. In Zimring's view, "What was
wrong with cheap foreign handguns was the people who were using them. It was only
after the same people switched to other weapons that the other weapons became the
problem." Id. The same problem applies to assault rifles: "If the real difference between
an AK-47 and other semi-automatic firearms is only the people who are using the AK-47
this month, what is to stop them from switching to other semi-automatic weapons?" Id. at
543.
91. Id. at 542.
92. Johnson, supra note 89, at AI-10; Zimring, supra note 5, at 168.
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munition control legislation. First, the shortcomings of the Moynihan bills suggest that
bullets cannot so easily be separated from firearms as a primary regulatory strategy for
reducing violent crime. Instead, ammunition restrictions and gun controls must be
allowed to compete on equal footing as mutually reinforcing components of a regulato-
ry scheme that strikes at both the existing inventory of weapons and the market for
new guns.93 Implemented in isolation, neither approach is likely to succeed. If ammu-
nition restrictions run too far ahead of gun controls, their benefits will be undermined
by the continuing availability of alternative weapons. Similarly, if bullet bans fall too
far behind the regulation of new weapons, the existing inventory of older guns is likely
to become more dangerous than it is today.
This prediction follows from the simple insight that if the manufacture and im-
portation of new handguns were halted by federal legislation, the primary source of
handguns would become the existing civilian inventory. Market pressures would drive
up the prices of these older weapons, creating incentives for both owners and thieves
that would increase the risk that old handguns would be transferred to new owners
with bad purposes.' Ammunition controls would then become the most effective
means of curbing this tendency.
A second simple lesson of the Moynihan bills is that future gun control strategies
should regulate on the basis of the most problematic ballistic features and functional
capabilities of ammunition and firearms generally, as opposed to focusing on the cali-
bers or brand-names of this year's most popular street weapons. This suggestion pre-
supposes sufficient technical proficiency on the part of the legislature to draw intel-
ligent distinctions among specific classes of weaponry and sufficient criminological
data to determine whether such distinctions might be of legislative significance.
Aside from a limited Congressional inquiry into the special dangers associated
with assault weapons, lawmakers have failed to engage in any systematic scrutiny of
the features that make some guns and grades of ammunition deadlier than others, or
more likely to be chosen for criminal misuse. Prompt congressional efforts to identify
those weapons which pose an unreasonable risk of harm are clearly advisable.
However, even amidst our present ignorance, some meaningful distinctions of
criminological importance can and should be drawn. Congress may decide, for exam-
ple, that reducing handgun firepower is a desirable regulatory objective. To secure this
end, the legislature would logically: (1) ban the manufacture and sale of all auto-load-
ing centerfire handguns; and (2) reinforce this restriction with a ban of all of the
centerfire cartridges currently utilized in the existing inventory of semi-automatic hand-
guns. The results of such legislation would only be partial; unregulated revolvers
would continue to be freely available and, as current trace request data reveals, revolv-
ers are frequently associated with violent crime.
But compared to its auto-loading counterpart, the revolver is slow and cumber-
93. This notion of a multilateral regulatory regime would seem to contradict
Moynihan's regulatory model of epidemiology and its particular emphasis on the bullet
as the "agent of injury" responsible for firearm-related death and injury. However, the
public health model does not necessarily implicate ammunition controls as the exclusive
"cure" for firearm violence. It simply creates a set of criteria on which ammunition con-
trols can be judged. The epidemiology of firearm violence should similarly lead to a
multilateral regulatory strategy designed to address the multiplicity of its causes. See
139 CONG. REC., supra note 8, at S612.
94. For a further discussion of this hypothesis see Zimring, supra note 5, at 197.
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some to load, difficult to fire rapidly with accuracy, and has an inherently low ammu-
nition capacity. These features translate to reduced firepower and, thus, to a reduced
capacity to inflict multiple wounds or wound multiple victims. Therefore, as a legisla-
tive compromise, a selective weapons ban favoring the continuing availability of the
revolver appears to be quite reasonable from a criminological standpoint.
Similarly, Congress might reasonably decide to suppress the manufacture and
sale of the high-velocity, high-energy handgun cartridges that tend to create the most
massive wounds in shooting victims. Given the flexibility with which a cartridge of
any size can be loaded, such a ban would not be conceived as a restriction on specific
calibers. Instead, Congress would simply determine a maximum threshold or a bench-
mark of ballistic performance measured in muzzle energy that no caliber could legally
exceed. If the paradox of legislating the design of "safer" bullets sounds absurd, one
must realize that international law has proscribed the military use of expanding bullets
for almost seventy years and still requires combat rounds to be fully-jacketed so as to
limit the size of wound tracts and reduce the numbers of battlefield fatalities. The
policy that limits the "lethalness" of the weapons American marines must carry into
combat should apply with double force to the civilian inventory of handguns.
Finally, the shortcomings of the Moynihan bills suggest nothing so clearly as the
need for comprehensiveness. While functionally-sound selective controls will
incrementally reduce the human toll of handgun violence, the surest solution is a cate-
gorical ban on future civilian sales of all centerfire handguns and centerfire handgun
ammunition. If this proposal sounds politically naive, one should consider the political
peril of supporting even the most modest gun control legislation. The cost of admission
to the gun control arena is very high. Legislators with the wherewithal to effect change
in this area may prefer to invest their political capital in a single comprehensive hand-
gun initiative rather than squander it piecemeal on a series of milder measures.
The foregoing proposals for both selective and comprehensive controls are not
without their costs; each would entail some significant intrusion into the prerogatives
of legitimate gun owners and sportsmen. However, unless Congress is prepared to
make some difficult, but principled choices concerning the appropriate role of the
American handgun, firearm-violence will continue to compromise our nation's future.
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